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Elections and Democracy: Armenia, A
Case Study
ELIZABETH F. DEFEIS*
I. INTRODUCTION
Following the breakup of the former Soviet Union, a move-
ment towards constitutionalism has enveloped Eastern Europe.
Yet, events indicate that the adoption of a constitution, even one
with a strong human fights component and separation of powers, is
merely the first step towards the development of a culture based
on the rule of law and reflective of democratic principles. Indeed,
following the adoption of new constitutions based on accepted
democratic models, governments have toppled because of political
fraud and corruption. Moreover, brutal repression of human rights
sometimes continues while new leaders espousing totalitarian ide-
ologies have been elected. One of the most daunting challenges
facing fledging democracies, however, is the ability of a govern-
ment to conduct elections consistent with international standards
and, more importantly, to accept the outcomes of such elections.
Free and fair elections are the sine qua non of a democratic
society.' Such elections reflect a society ruled by the people
* Professor of Law, Seton Hall University, School of Law. The author acknowl-
edges, with thanks, the assistance of her research assistant Kristen M. Jasket, J.D. Candi-
date Class of 2000, Seton Hall University, School of Law. Professor Defeis assisted the
Republic of Armenia in drafting its constitution upon a request from the United States
Information Agency and an invitation from the Government of Armenia. She also
chaired the OSCE mission to Armenia in January 1996, to provide technical assistance
with respect to the electoral recommendations and was the legal expert for the OSCE in
the 1998 Presidential Elections. During her visits to Armenia, Professor Defeis met with
members of the government, Parliament, the Central Electoral Commission and opposi-
tion parties.
1. See Christina M. Cerna, Universal Democracy: An International Legal Right or
the Pipe Dream of the West? 27 N.Y.U.J. INT'L L. & POL. 289, 295 (1995). The existence
of a democratic government-evidenced by fair and free periodic elections, three
branches of government, an independent judiciary, freedom of political expression,
equality before the law, and due process-is sine qua non to the enjoyment of human
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who have openly participated in its governance.2 Characterized
as a democratic entitlement, self-governance is emerging as an
internationally-protected human right.3 Yet, the premise that
free elections are a significant indicator of a democratic society
has been challenged.4 Critics note that some democratically-
elected governments continue to infringe on the basic civil
rights guaranteed under their own newly-adopted constitu-
tions.5 These critics further contend that these governments
usurp power in violation of Constitutional limits. 6 For example,
elections in Kazakhstan and Kirgizstan have resulted in few
civil liberties, and a weak judiciary and legislature. 7 In Azer-
rights. Id. at 295. Elections are indispensable to representative government and comprise
the sine qua non of any democratic entitlement. Kifi Darko Asante, Election Monitor-
ing's Impact on the Law: Can it be Reconciled With Sovereignty and Nonintervention?, 26
N.Y.U.J. INT'L L. & POL. 235,276 (1994).
2. See Fareed Zakaria, The Rise of Liberal Democracy, COUNCIL ON FOREIGN
RELATIONS INC., Nov. 21, 1997, at 3, available in LEXIS, Allnews File.
3. See Thomas M. Franck, The Emerging Right to Democratic Governance, 86 AM. J.
INT'L L. 46 (1992); see also Gregory H. Fox & Georg Nolte, Intolerant Democracies, 36
HARV. INT'L L.J. 1, 3 (1995); JAMES CRAWFORD, DEMOCRACY IN INTERNATIONAL
LAW 6 (1994); Babacar Ndiaye, International Co-operation to Promote Democracy and
Human Rights: Principles and Programmes, 49 REV. INT'L COMM'N JURISTS 23 (1992);
Gregory H. Fox, The Right to Political Participation in International Law, 86 AM. SOC.
INT'L L. 249, 252 (1992); Melida N. Hodgson, When to Accept, When to Abstain" A
Framework for U.N. Election Monitoring, 25 N.Y.U.J. INT'L L. & POL. 137, 152 (1992).
See, e.g., Jon M. Ebersole, The United Nations' Response to Requests for Assistance in
Electoral Matters, 33 VA. J. INT'L L. 91 (1992).
4. See Jennifer Denise Rogers, Miller v. Johnson: The Supreme Court "Remaps"
Shaw v. Reno, 56 LA. L. REV. 981-56 ("The right to vote in free elections and participate
in the political process is the most basic right in a democratic society.").
Consider first the difficulty of deciding which national experiences test the effi-
cacy of liberal democracy. Most would agree that a nation, to count as a liberal
democracy, should have free and fair elections, effective channels for the ex-
pression of dissent, equality before the law coupled with effective implementa-
tion of legal guarantees, and a market economy based on private property rights.
Paul B. Stephan III, The Fall-Understanding The Collapse Of The Soviet System, 29
SUFFOLK U.L. REV. 17,28 (1995).
5. See Fox & Nolte, supra note 3, at 1-2.
6. See id
7. See Fred Hiatt, Kazakhstan's Stability Teeters on Ethnic, Economic Woes, WASH.
POST, Feb. 14, 1994, at A17; see also Steve LeVine, Kazakhstan Elects Parliament; Cam-
paign Set Up to Favor Authoritarian President, WASH. POST, Mar. 8, 1994, at A14; Steve
LeVine, International Observers Condemn Kazakhstan's Parliamentary Elections, WASH.
POST, Mar. 9, 1994, at A12; Steve LeVine, Kazakh Chief Controls New Parliament,
WASH. POST, Mar. 11, 1994, at A19; Kazakhs Must Vote in Runoff, WASH. POST, Dec. 11,
1995, at A18; see also Margaret Shapiro, Kirgizstan- New Freedom Amid Poverty; Re-
former Leads Country on China's Western Border, WASH. POST, Apr. 4, 1992, at A17;
Steve LeVine, Ex-Leaders Rebound in Central Asia; "Unreconstructed Soviets" Bringing
Back Strong-Arm Politics, WASH. POST, Dec. 26, 1992, at A25; R. Jeffrey Smith, Gore
1998] Elections and Democracy: Armenia 457
baidjan, a democratically elected government was overthrown
by a military coup which resulted in a severe repression of hu-
man rights.8 In subsequent elections, however, an overwhelm-
ing majority elected the leader of the coup as the country's next
president. 9
Brings Praise to Kirgiz Republic; Vice President Visits Central Asian Nation to Encourage
Reforms, WASH. POST, Dec. 13, 1993, at A16.
8. See Lally Weymouth, Azerbaijan-Who'll Stop the Russians?, WASH. POST, Oct.
11, 1994, at A17; see also Margaret Shapiro, Fighting Escalates Anew in Nagorno-
Karbakh: Car Bomb Misses Georgian Official, Kills 4, WASH. POST, June 14, 1992, at
A31; Michael Dobbs, Opposition Forces in Azerbaijan Seize Capital, Government Build-
ings, WASH. POST, May 16, 1992, at A17.
9. See Fred Hiatt, Many Ex-Soviet Republics Find Democracy Elusive, WASH. POST,
June 8, 1995, at Al; Margaret Shapiro, Azerbaijani Leader, Restored to Power, Imposes
Emergency Rule, WASH. POST, May 15, 1992, at A31.
In those countries that are continuing to struggle with adoption of democratic
principles, electoral concerns remain problematic. For example, in November 1996, op-
position parties in Croatia boycotted meetings of Parliament because "of the governing
party's refusal to honor the spirit of the municipal elections last year in Zagreb, the capi-
tal." See Chris Hedges, Hard-liner Are Regarded as Likely to Succeed Croatia's Ailing
President, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 8, 1996, at A8.
Serbia also suffered from election tampering claims. In November of 1996, the
opposition party won several municipal elections and warned President Slobodan Mi-
losevic, head of the Socialist Party, to "not tamper with the vote." Furthermore, allega-
tions arose regarding the "irregularities during the balloting" and the barring of opposi-
tion monitors from several polling stations. See Serbia Opposition. Claims Municipal Vote
Victory, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 19, 1996, at A12. Ten months later, in September of 1997, the
opposition parties "refused to compete" and accused Milosevic, the former President of
the republic, of fixing the election in his favor by changing certain voting laws. These
charges prompted the Helsinki Commission to release a declaration, "We shall not ob-
serve Serbia's Elections." Relevant sections of the report state:
These conditions make impossible even remotely free and fair elections. Be-
yond that, they show the Serbian Authorities' clear disregard for the advice of
the international community has given them regarding elections. Given these
facts and the record of manipulation and intimidation in previous Serbian elec-
tions, some of which the commission had observed, we strongly believe that
these elections do not deserve the credibility that international observations by
the OSCE could give them.
We call upon the Belgrade authorities to respect the human rights and funda-
mental freedoms of the people of Serbia-all the people of Serbia-instead of
trampling upon those rights in order to maintain power.
Helsinki Commission "We Shall Not Observe Serbia's Elections," CSCE NEWS RELEASE,
Sept. 11, 1997, at 1-2.
Bosnia has also confronted election problems. In late 1995, the "question of
elections" was a "highly charged one." See Roger Cohen, Clinton Seeks to Shore up Mus-
lim-Croat Federation, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 3, 1995, at A12. These questions centered on
how the people would elect central parliament. Bosnia held presidential elections on Sep-
tember 14, 1996. In that election, there were allegations that materials were missing from
ballot boxes, that names of qualified citizens did not appear on voter registration lists, and
that about five to ten percent of the longtime residents of each village did not appear on
the final OSCE produced voter registration list. See Nigel Purvis, Observations on the
Loy. L.A. Int'l & Comp. L.J.
International organizations, particularly the United Na-
tions and the Organization on Security and Cooperation in
Europe (OSCE), devote substantial resources to developing in-
ternational norms pertaining to electoral rights. 10 Additionally,
these organizations assist in conducting and monitoring elec-
tions in the new nations.11
The Universal Declaration of Human Rights of 1948 af-
firms that, "[t]he will of the people shall be the basis of the
authority of government; this will shall be expressed in periodic
and genuine election which shall be by universal and equal suf-
frage and shall be held by secret vote or by equivalent free
voting procedures."'1 2 Article 25(b) of the International Cove-
nant on Civil and Political Rights (CCPR) states that the right
"to vote and to be elected at genuine periodic elections ... shall
be by universal and equal suffrage and shall be held by secret
ballot."'1 3 U.N. Resolution 150, of December 18, 1990, reaf-
firmed these principles. 14 The resolution stressed the following:
[P]eriodic and genuine elections are a necessary and indispen-
sable element of sustained efforts to protect the rights and in-
terests of the governed and that, as a matter of practical experi-
ence, the right of everyone to take part in the government of his
or her country is a crucial factor in the effective enjoyment by
all of a wide range of other human rights and fundamental
freedoms, embracing political, economic, social and cultural
rights.15
Bosnian Elections from Prijedor, Repulika Srpska, 21-SPF FLETCHER F. WORLD AFF. 15,
at 23-24. Further, "about half the rural population remains illiterate or cannot afford
needed eye glasses. Therefore, they cannot mark their ballots in secrecy as the rules re-
quire." Id. Fraud was a clear concern. One observer remarked, "It is almost impossible
for Americans to understand what democracy means to people who have known only to-
talitarianism and the chaos of war." See Michael Miller, Ballots Not Bullets: One Attor-
ney's Experience as an Election Supervisor in Bosnia, 69 N.Y. ST. B.J., 811 (1997).
10. See Hodgson, supra note 3, at 153-54.
11. See id.
12. Universal Declaration of Human Rights, G.A. Res. 217A, U.N. GAOR 3d Sess.,
at 71, U.N. Doc. A/810 (1948).
13. International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, opened for signature Dec.
19, 1966, 999 U.N.T.S. 171.
14. See Hodgson, supra note 3, at 141 ("Resolution 45/150 further affirms the Or-
ganization's commitment to electoral assistance at the request of member states. Its sig-
nificance stems from the unprecedented level of U.N. commitment to election monitoring
that has been carried on so far without a formal mandate.").
15. Enhancing the Effectiveness of the Principle of Periodic and Genuine Elections,
G.A. Res. 150, art. 2, U.N. Doc. A/150 (1991).
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Furthermore, the resolution declared "determining the will of
the people requires an electoral process that provides an equal op-
portunity for all citizens to become candidates and put forward
their political views, individually and in co-operation with others,
as provided in national constitutions and laws."
16
International standards pertaining to the conduct of elections
have been developed. For example, the OSCE Document of the
Copenhagen Meeting of the Conference of the Human Dimension
of the CSCE, sets forth the requirements that participating states
must follow:
(7.1) hold free and fair elections at reasonable intervals, as es-
tablished by law;
(7.4) ensure that votes are cast by secret ballot or by equiva-
lent free voting procedure, and that they are counted and re-
ported honestly with the official results made public;
(7.7) ensure that law and public policy work to permit political
campaigning to be conducted in a fair and free atmosphere in
which neither administrative action, violence nor intimidation
bars the parties and the candidates from freely presenting their
views and qualifications, or prevents the voters from learning
and discussing them or from casting their vote free of fear of
retribution;
(8) The participating States consider that the presence of ob-
servers, both foreign and domestic, can enhance the electoral
process for States in which elections are taking place.17
The OSCE Commitments can be summed up in seven key words
central to democratic tradition: "universal, equal, fair, secret, free,
transparent and accountable. ' 18
16. Id. art. 3.
17. See Document of the Copenhagen Meeting of the Conference on the Human Di-
mension of the CSCE, June 29, 1990, reprinted in 11 HUM. RTs. L.J. 232 (1990).
18. OSCE/ODIHR ELECTION OBSERVATION HANDBOOK (2d ed. 1997) [hereinafter
ELECTION HANDBOOK].
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II. ARMENIA: A CASE STUDY
Some have characterized Armenia as an "island of democratic
reform" among the former Soviet Republics. 19 Nevertheless, the
international community has expressed concerns following the
flawed first election of deputies in 1995, the referendum on the
adoption of the Constitution in 1995, the Presidential election of
1996, and more recently the 1998 Presidential Election.20
From Armenia's initial movement towards independence, the
nation's leadership was committed to establishing-through exist-
ing legal norms-a new republic based upon the rule of law. In
1990, by a vote of 183 to 2, the Armenian Supreme Soviet adopted
the Declaration on Armenia's Independence as the basis for a new
Constitution. 21 In 1991, in full compliance with the Soviet Consti-
tution, ninety-nine percent of the voters adopted a referendum for
secession.22 The President of Armenia then established a Consti-
tutional Commission to draft a new constitution, which would
guarantee individual rights and freedoms, as well as to promote
19. See Daniel Sneider, Democracy Teeters in Three Ex-Soviet States, CHRISTIAN SC.
MONITOR, May 30, 1995, at 6; see also Armenia and Karabakh (BBC broadcast, Aug. 19,
1993), available in LEXIS, BBCSWB File (acknowledging the United States' offer of as-
sistance to aid Armenia with its "democratic and economic development"); Fred Hiatt,
Even for Armenia, Democracy has Some Limits, INT'L HERALD TRIB., June 9, 1995. In
addition, U.N. Secretary-General Boutros Boutros-Ghali said that Armenia's 30 political
parties "are contributing to the deepening of democracy." See UN Chief Praises Armenia,
Warns of Hard Road Ahead, AGENCE FRANCE PRESSE, Nov. 3, 1994, available in LEXIS,
AFP File.
20. See Elizabeth F. Defeis, Constitution Building in Armenia: ANation Once Again,
2 PARKER SCH. J.E. EUR. L. 153 (1995); see also Elizabeth F. Defeis, Armenian Constitu-
tional Referendum: Towards a Democratic Process, 9 TEMP. INT'L & COMP. L.J. 269
(regarding background information on the democratic developments in Armenia follow-
ing its dissolution from the former Soviet Union).
21. See Leyla Boulton, Armenia Adopts Declaration of Independence, FIN. TIMES,
Aug. 24, 1990, at 16 (stating that the Declaration called for a new constitution and pro-
vided that only Armenian laws were to be valid in the Republic of Armenia); see also
David Remnick, Armenia Declares Its Independence; Soviet Republic Claims Control Over
Its Own Army, Economy, WASH. POST, Aug. 24, 1990, at A18 (reporting that the Decla-
ration was to supplement the Soviet Constitution in the Republic of Armenia and to serve
as a foundation for a new Armenian Constitution).
22. See Armenia:" Tiny Republic in Unfriendly Neighborhood, REUTERS, Sept. 23,
1991, available in LEXIS, REUWLD File (stating that 99% of the participants voted in
favor of independence). Armenia became the twelfth of the fifteen republics of the for-
mer Soviet Union to declare independence from Moscow. Id; see also Carol Williams,
Armenia Declares Independence, L.A. TIMES, Sept. 24, 1991, at 11 (stating that over 99%
of the voters "endorsed a free Armenia in Saturday's referendum").
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the prosperity of Armenia's economy.23 The Commission favored
legislation in modular blocks, to deal with major issues which
could then be incorporated into the constitution at a later time.
24
This method of creating the constitution would allow for change
and evaluation.
In June 1992, frustrated by the perceived lack of progress on
the adoption of a new constitution, opposition groups formed a
"National Alliance. '25 The National Alliance initially called a
Constitutional Convention of elected delegates 26 to draft the Con-
stitution, institute new Parliamentary elections, 27 and seek the
resignation of the President. 2
8
In June 1993, the Constitutional Commission, headed by the
President and the opposition parties, each completed their own
draft constitutions. 29 The main distinction between the two drafts
was the concentration of power.30 In the Constitutional Commis-
sion's draft, power was concentrated in the Executive branch. 31
By contrast, in the opposition parties' draft, Parliament wielded
more power.32
In 1995, Parliament accepted the Constitutional Commission's
23. See Armen Sarksian, Armenia: Building a Democracy, ARMENIAN INT'L MAG.,
Aug. 1992, at 16. Sarksian provides a thorough analysis of the Armenian governmental
and political power structure, and observes that "Armenia's body politic has embraces the
best and sometimes the worst values of Western democracy." Id.
24. See id. at 20. The Armenian government would consult American, French and
German legal experts. One group of Armenian experts was to study the constitutional
history of a number of Western countries. A second group was to elaborate the specific
standards required by the situation in Armenia. Sarksian provides a thorough analysis of
the Armenian governmental and practical power structure, and observes that "Armenia's
body politic has embraced the best and sometimes the worst values of Western democ-
racy." Id. at 16.
25. See Report on Armenia's Presidential Election of September 22, 1996, COMM'N ON
SEC. AND COOP. IN EUR. (U.N. Doc. AR 5/2), Dec. 1996, at 5 [hereinafter Presidential
Report].
26. See Defeis, supra note 20, at 166 n.54. Fifty members were to compose the Con-
stitutional Convention. They were to complete their work within three to six months with
each delegate having the honorary title of "Founder." They were to determine the
method of adoption of the Constitution, subject to approval by the Parliament. The Bill
did not pass.
27. See Presidential Report, supra note 25, at 5.
28. See Angry Armenians March on Palace, THE GUARDIAN F., Feb. 6, 1993, at 14.
29. See President Speaks in Favour of Presidential Form of Government for Republic,
BBC SUMMARY OF WORLD BROADCASTS, June 15,1994.
30. See id.
31. See id.
32. See id.
1998]
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draft.33 Subsequently, in July, Armenia held both Parliamentary
elections and a referendum on the Constitution. 34 The referen-
dum on the Constitution carried sixty-eight percent of the vote
cast 35 and members of pro-government parties constituted the
overwhelming number of deputies elected.36 Armenia scheduled
presidential elections for the following year. In 1996, President
Levon Ter-Petrossian was re-elected as President. 37
III. THE CONSTITUTION
A. An Overview
Initially, the Constitution of Armenia sets forth general philo-
sophical and legal principles for the Republic of Armenia. 38 The
Constitution vests power in the people, affirms constitutional su-
premacy, guarantees human rights, assures equal protection of
property, and affirms freedom of economic activity.39 Further-
more, to foster favorable relations with all nations, the Constitu-
tion bases its foreign policy on international laws.40 Accordingly,
international treaties prevail over domestic law.
41
33. See Sixty-Eight Percent Back New Constitution for Armenia, AGENCE FRANCE
PRESSE, July 8, 1995, available in LEXIS, AFP File.
34. See id.
35. See id.
36. See id.
37. See Presidential Report, supra note 25, at 14.
38. See CONSTITUTIONS OF THE COUNTRIES OF THE WORLD (Gisbert H. Flanz ed.,
1997).
39. See id. The Armenian Constitution provides the following: "The state guaran-
tees the protection of human rights and freedoms based on the Constitution and the laws,
in accordance with the principles and norms of international law." ARM. CONST. art. 4.
The right to property is recognized and protected in the Republic of Armenia.
The owner of property may dispose of, sue, and manage the property at his or
her discretion. The right to property may not be exercised so as to cause dam-
age to the environment, or infringe on the rights and lawful interests of other
persons, society or the state. The state shall guarantee the free development and
equal legal protection of all forms of property, the freedom of economic activity
and free economic competition.
Id art. 8.
40. Article 9 states: "The foreign policy of the Republic of Armenia shall be con-
ducted in accordance with the norms of international law, with the aim of establishing
good neighborly and mutually beneficial relations with all states." Id art. 9.
41. Article 6 states:
The supremacy of the law shall be guaranteed in the Republic of Armenia. The
Constitution of the Republic has supreme judicial force and its norms are appli-
cable directly. Laws found to contradict the Constitution, as well as other judi-
cial acts found to contradict the Constitution and the laws shall have no judicial
[Vol. 20:455462
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Armenia's Constitution protects the fundamental rights, lib-
erties, and duties of individuals. These protections reflect the
western tradition of inalienable rights and individual autonomy as
well as the socialist tradition of collective economic and social
rights. Specifically, the Constitution includes the following: the
rights of privacy and expression; the right to form political parties;
due process;42 and certain procedures in criminal matters, such as
the rebuttable presumption of innocence. 43 Furthermore, the
Constitution affirms family values, calls for the payment of taxes,
and requires participation in the national defense. 44 Most impor-
tantly, it affirms the rule of law and declares that "everyone shall
uphold the Constitution and the laws."' 45 Despite the controversy
surrounding the status of the Diaspora,46 however, the Constitu-
tion lacks a clear definition of citizenship.
47
The Armenian presidency as empowered by the new Consti-
tution has been characterized as the strongest in the world.48 The
force. Laws shall take effect only after official publication. Unpublished juridi-
cal acts pertaining to human rights, freedoms and duties shall have no juridical
force. International treaties signed on behalf of the Republic of Armenia shall
take effect only after ratification. International treaties that have been ratified
are a constituent part of the legal system of the Republic. If norms are provided
in these treaties other than those provided by the laws of the Republic, then the
norms provided in the treaty shall prevail. International treaties that contradict
the Constitution may be ratified after making a corresponding amendment to
the Constitution.
Id art. 6.
42. Under Article 39, every Armenian "has the right to the public hearing of his case
by an independent and impartial court maintaining all requirements of justice under con-
ditions of equality in order to regain his rights that have been violated as well as to ascer-
tain the justification of an accusation presented him." Id. art. 39.
43. See id arts. 21, 24, 41.
44. See id arts. 32, 46, 47.
45. Article 48 of the Armenia Constitution provides:
Everyone shall uphold the Constitution and the laws, and respect the rights,
freedoms and dignity of others. The exercise of rights and freedoms shall not
serve toward the violent overthrow of the Constitutional order, for the instiga-
tion of national, racial or religious hatred, or for the incitement to violence and
war.
Id. art. 48.
46. For an explanation on the concept of the Diaspora, see Armenia: Tiny Republic
in Unfriendly Neighborhood, REUTERS, Sept. 23, 1991 available in LEXIS, News Library,
REUWLD.
47. Article 14 of the Armenian Constitution provides: "The procedures for acquiring
and terminating citizenship of the Republic of Armenia are determined by law. Indi-
viduals of Armenian origin shall acquire citizenship of the Republic of Armenia through a
simplified procedure. A citizen of the Republic of Armenia may not be a citizen of an-
other state simultaneously." Id art. 14.
48. See Chrystia Freeland, Armenia Polls Test Fragile Democracy, FIN. TIMES, July 5,
Loy. L.A. Int'l & Comp. L.J.
President is responsible for the execution of the laws 49 and con-
trols the agenda of the legislative body.50 In addition, the Presi-
dent manages foreign policy, confers citizenship, and maintains
control over the government and the Prime Minister. The Presi-
dent also appoints the government of Armenia, which is composed
of the Prime Minister, and other subordinate ministers. 51 The
government develops and implements financial, economic and tax
policies 52 as well as state policy regarding science, education,
health and culture, national security and foreign relations policy.
53
Moreover, the President appoints the judges54 and is empowered
to schedule special elections after consulting with the President of
the National Assembly and the Prime Minister. 55 Most impor-
tantly, the President of Armenia can dissolve the National As-
sembly any time before the last six months of the President's
term.56
Legislative authority is vested in the National Assembly, a
unicameral body composed on 131 deputies elected for a four-year
term.57 Each delegate must be twenty-five years old, a citizen for
at least five years preceding candidacy, a permanent resident for at
least five years, and have the right to vote.58
The powers of the National Assembly are "fixed by the Con-
stitution. 59 The National Assembly is similar to the constitutional
framework of the United States, wherein the legislature acts only
pursuant to powers specified in the constitution. There are no in-
herent powers in the legislative body60 and no equivalent of a
"necessary and proper clause" which might broaden the power of
1995, at 2 (quoting Professor Herman Schwartz, a Professor of Constitutional Law,
American University, Washington College of Law).
49. See ARM. CONST. art. 49.
50. See id. art. 55.
51. See id. arts. 55(4), 85.
52. See id art. 89.
53. See generally id.
54. See id. art. 55(11).
55. See id art. 55(3).
56. See id.
57. See id art. 63.
58. See id. art. 64. Once elected, a delegate cannot be prosecuted for activities re-
lated to his status. In addition, the Assembly must approve the criminal prosecution of
one of its members. Id. art. 66.
59. Id. art. 62.
60. See id. ch. IV.
[Vol. 20:455
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the legislature. 61 The National Assembly has power in three in-
stances: (1) at its own initiative (such as the creation of commis-
sions to draft legislation);62 (2) on the proposal of the President
(such as demanding a new discussion of a law); 63 and (3) on the
proposal of the Government (such as the presentation of the work
plan). 64
While both the Government and the individual delegates may
initiate legislation, the Government to a large extent controls the
legislative agenda by setting the sequence for discussing draft
laws.65 The Government presents the budget to the National As-
sembly for certification 66 while the National Assembly oversees
the implementation of the budget. 67
Further weakening the legislative branch is the controversial
provision that the National Assembly can be dissolved by the
President and new members elected through special elections.
The President may veto actions of the Parliament, 68 but Parlia-
ment in turn may override the President's veto by a majority vote
of the overall number of delegates. 69 Finally, the President may
convent an extraordinary session of the National Assembly and set
the agenda.70
The Armenian Constitution creates a Constitutional Court, a
Tribunal Court, Review Courts, Courts of Appeals, Economic
Courts, and Military Courts.71 Judges are appointed for life and
cannot be members of a political party.72 The Justice Council,
61. See id.
62. See id art. 73.
63. See id. arts. 55, § 2, 72.
64. See id. arts. 74, 89. The Government exercises the executive authority of Arme-
nia. It is composed of the Prime Minister, appointed by the President, and the ministers
who are also appointed by the President after consulting with the Prime Minister. Id. arts.
55, § 4, 85.
65. Id. art. 73.
66. Id. art. 76.
67. Id. art. 77.
68. Id. art.55. Article 55 does not specifically provide for a presidential veto. Rather,
article 55, § 2 provides that the "President can demand a new discussion of the law." Id.
art. 55, § 2.
69. Id. art. 72. In the past, Parliament was unable to pass significant legislation be-
cause it failed to achieve a quorum. Because of the ban on outside employment, one
might anticipate better attendance; thus, a quorum based upon a majority vote of all the
delegates might be achieved.
70. See id art. 70.
71. See id. art. 92.
72. See id. arts. 96, 98.
1998] 465
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headed by the President, 73 oversees judicial nominations and dis-
cipline. 74
The judiciary's role, however, is not defined with specificity. 75
In fact, the judiciary of Armenia may be characterized as feeble
and lacking judicial independence. Central to this problem is the
fact that the judiciary is subject to considerable political pres-
sure.76 The constitutional provisions, which govern the judiciary,
do not insulate the judiciary from this pressure. This lack of con-
stitutional protection weakens the judiciary and limits its effec-
tiveness. 77
B. Elections: A Testing Ground
Elections have proven to be the testing grounds for fledgling
democracies. Recent elections have subjected Armenia to inter-
national criticism. 78
The constitutional provisions pertaining to elections are spe-
cific and provide for regulation at both the national and local lev-
els.79 The Constitution provides that "the people exercise their
power through free elections and referenda, as well as through
state and local self-governing bodies and public officials as pro-
vided by the Constitution. '80 Article 3 of the Constitution states
that presidential elections will occur "by secret ballot on the basis
of a general, equal and direct right to vote."' 81 Regarding disputes
over election results, only the President, presidential candidates,
and at least one third of the delegates may appeal to the Constitu-
tional Court for review. 82
73. See id. art. 94.
74. See idt art. 95. The Constitutional Court reviews Court decisions and legislative
acts.
75. See Armenian Country Report on Human Rights Practice for 1996, BUR. OF
DEMOCRACY, HUMAN RIGHTS AND LABOR (U.S. Dept. State), Jan. 30, 1997, at 4
[hereinafter Country Report].
76. See Country Report, supra note 75, at 4.
77. See icL; see also ARM. CONsT. arts. 104-10.
78. See Country Report, supra note 75, at 1.
79. See ARM. CONST. art. 3
80. Id. art. 3.
81. Id.
82. See ARM. CONST. art. 39.
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C. The Electoral Process
In addition to the Constitutional provisions, two laws-The
Presidential Election Law and The Elections of Local Self-
Governing Law-and a series of implementation regulations, gov-
ern the Armenian elections.83 The Central Electoral Commission
(CEC) is responsible for the overall implementation and interpre-
tation of election laws.84 The structure of the subordinate Elec-
toral commissions, however, is complex. Eleven Regional Elec-
toral Commissions (REC) aggregate and verify election results,
and exercise substantial administrative control.85 There are also
930 Community Electoral Commissions (CoEC).86 These Com-
missions provide the draft voter lists, gather Precinct Electoral
Commissions (PEC) results, count voter coupons, and pass this in-
formation to the REC.87 The PECs administer the election in
polling stations and count the votes.
88
D. Armenian Election Process in 1995, 1996 and 1998
The first democratic election of the Armenian National As-
sembly and a referendum on the Constitution occurred in 1995.
The timing of the election and the referendum were severely criti-
cized. On January 13, 1995, prior to the scheduled election, Presi-
dent Ter-Petrossian charged the leading opposition, the Dashnak
Party,89 with being a secret terrorist organization 90 and banned the
party and its newspaper.91
The Armenian Supreme Court subsequently reduced the ban
to a six month suspension, which expired the day after the re-
83. See SIMON OSBORN, ARMENIAN PRESIDENTIAL ELECrIONS SEPTEMBER 24,
1996 FINAL REPORT, (Office of Democratic Institutions and Human Rights, 1996)
[hereinafter OSCE FINAL REPORT].
84. See id.
85. Parliamentary parties nominate the members of both commissions. The parties
retain the right to remove and replace members. See id.
86. See id
87. See id By law, each CoEC compiles voter lists for each PEC in their area and
displays the lists in the polling stations. In addition, the military prepares its own lists,
which are presented to the REC and allocated to the PEGs.
88. See id
89. The Dashnak Party is also referred to as the Armenian Revolutionary Federa-
tion. It is the oldest political party in Armenia.
90. See Presidential Repor4 supra note 25, at 4. The President made this change on
Jan. 13, 1995. See id
91. Seeid. at4.
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scheduled election in July of 1995.92 This suspension effectively
prevented the Dashnak party from participating in the election.
More than 600 observers from foreign countries witnessed the
election.93 The Report of the OSCE/UN Joint Operation con-
cluded that the parliamentary election constituted an important
first step in establishing a democratic process in Armenia and
characterized the process as generally free, but not fair.94
While criticism of the 1995 election centered primarily on the
banning of the Dashnak party,95 the criticism of the 1996 Presi-
dential election focused on ballot tampering, voter calculation dis-
crepancies and subsequent repression of opposition leaders.96 The
1996 Presidential election was bitterly contested. Observers noted
that voter lists were often not displayed, polling stations were in-
adequate, and voters registered on election day without proper
identification. 97 In addition, the Commissions, especially at the
regional level, became more partisan in favor of the incumbent as
election day approached. 98 Furthermore, although Presidential
Election Law provides equal access for candidates to free televi-
sion and radio advertising, Ter-Petrossian, the incumbent, had a
clear advantage because the other candidates were not allowed to
use their remaining free television rights during the week immedi-
ately preceding the elections.99
92. See id.
93. See Tigran Liloyan, Elections and Refendum to be held in Armenia Today, TASS,
July 5, 1995, available in LEXIS, World Library, TASS File. Before monitoring the elec-
tions, the observers met with representatives of the authorities, the opposition, and elec-
toral commissions. Id.
94. See Country Report, supra note 75, at 1 (local and international observers charac-
terized the 1995 elections as "generally free, but not fair.").
95. See, e.g., Dashnak Party Suspended for Six Months By Supreme Court, BBC
Broadcast, Jan. 16, 1995, available in LEXIS, News Library, BBCSWB File.
96. See Lawyers Committee for Human Rights Critique of the U.S. Department of
State's Country Reports on Human Rights Practices 1996, at 36 (July 1997) [hereinafter
Critique]. "Observers noted significant breaches of international election standards dur-
ing the elections, including harassment and intimidation of voters, non-secret voting in
one-third of its observations, stolen ballot-boxes, ballot-box stuffing, ballot tampering and
irregularities in vote calculations at polling stations and election offices." Id.
97. See OSCE FINAL REPORT, supra note 83. OSCE observers noted that the lists
were late and members of the REC were not always allowed to verify their accuracy.
Further, some lists were amended on election day without PEC chairman approval.
OSCE observers noted that over half of polling stations correctly conducted the election
process. Breach of the law was found in only 23% of polling stations. Further, only 2.6%
of voting stations allowed voting without photo identification. Id.
98. See id.
99. See id. at 6.
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The election results were further stigmatized by the brutal
crackdown on opposition leaders, who were arrested and detained
following demonstrations protesting the election results. Seven-
teen prominent opposition leaders and over 100 participants in the
1996 elections were arrested or detained for "participating in mass
disorder." 100 The State Department's Armenian Country Report
on Human Rights Practices for 1996 notes that "international ob-
servers reported that serious breaches of the election law and nu-
merous irregularities resulted in a lack of confidence in the integ-
rity of the overall election process." 10 1 Following the release of
the State Department Reports, The Lawyer's Committee pub-
lished a Critique, noting that the government's conduct following
the presidential elections "precipitated a crisis without precedent
in the short history of the newly independent republic.' 10
2
IV. CONSTITUTIONAL CHALLENGES TO THE ELECTION PROCESS
Two presidential candidates, Vazgen Manoukian and Ashot
Manoucharian, challenged the results of the 1996 election against
the CEC in the Constitutional Court in an attempt to invalidate
the results. 103 Under Article 9 of the Law on the Election of the
President of Armenia, The CEC is responsible for the organization
and supervision of the election.104
100. See Critique, supra note 96. The Report gives even higher figures. It alleges that
the government arrested 200 opposition party members, banned two leading opposition
parties that had participated in the election, destroyed their equipment and shut down
their offices. "The government also banned all public political gatherings and arrested
any persons who happened to pass by the area where demonstrations had occurred." Id
at 36-39 Most of those arrested were "severely beaten," held in "secret prison cells" and
were forced to "sign statements confession their guilt in 'actions against the govern-
ment."' Id.
101. Country Report, supra note 75, at 1.
102. Critique, supra note 96, at 35-39. The Critique alleges that the government at-
tacked and imprisoned almost 200 opposition party members and concludes that this inci-
dent highlights the "structural weaknesses of the Armenian government and the laws that
permitted these violations to occur." Id at 39. Fraud was widespread that there was a
call for new elections. The critique goes on to describe the storming of the parliament
building, on the rumor that an opposition leader was being detained inside, and notes that
the speaker, Babken Araktsyan and deputy of the parliament Ara Sahakyan were at-
tacked. The Courts have not yet addressed these incidents. See id
103. See id. at 8.
104. The Constitutional Court is responsible for resolving "disputes relating to refer-
enda and results of elections for the president of the Republic and delegates and the Law
of the Republic of Armenia." ARM. CONST. art. 100. Specifically, the Constitution pro-
vides:
Article 100. The Constitutional Court, in accordance with the law; ... shall rule
4691998]
Loy. L.A. Int'l & Comp. L.J. [Vol. 20:455
The plaintiffs contended that the right to support their claim
to direct elections by secret ballot was violated during the prepa-
ration and implementation of the election, thereby directly affect-
ing the results of the election. To support their claim, documents
evidencing numerical discrepancies, testimony of eyewitnesses and
foreign observers were presented including the final report of the
OSCE and the Observer's mission of October 16, 1996.105 In ad-
dition, they presented special opinions of the proxies and members
of the electoral commissions, protocols, certificates and analyses
prepared by the appealing party, and copies of the final protocol of
the electoral commission. 106 The CEC countered the plaintiff's
evidence with summarized protocols, members' special opinions,
REC protocols, and results from 930 communities and 1155 pre-
cincts. 107
In a key ruling, Armenia's Constitutional Court held that al-
legations of voting infringement should have been presented to the
Electoral Commission itself or to the court of general jurisdiction
as prescribed by law.108 Since the Plaintiffs did not follow this
procedure, the Court elected not to consider their evidence. 109
on disputes concerning referenda and the results of Presidential and parliamen-
tary election;
Article 101. The Constitutional Court may hear cases submitted by: . . . Presi-
dential and the parliamentary candidates on disputes concerning election results;
Id arts. 100(3), 101(3). Regarding issues raised under Point 3 of Article 100 of the Con-
stitution, the following may appeal to the Constitutional Court:
(1) The President of the Republic
(2) At lease one-third of the members of the National Assembly
(3) Candidates for the President of the Republic and for members of the Na-
tional Assembly, on issues connected with referenda, the results of the election
of the President and National Assembly members within a month after the offi-
cial pronouncement of results.
Id. art. 101(1)-(2), (4). The appeal to the Constitutional Court on issues connected with
referenda, the results of the election of the President and deputies of the National As-
sembly within a month after the official publication of the results.
105. See generally OSCE FINAL REPORT, supra note 83.
106. See Presidential Report, supra note 25, at 19.
107. See id.
108. See Country Report, supra note 75, at 8.
109. See The Decision of the Constitutional Court of the Republic of Armenia regard-
ing the case on the litigation of the results of the September 22, 1996, election of the
President of the Republic of Armenia. The decision provides:
The investigation of the concrete arguments of the appealing parties on the facts
of infringements during the preparation, implementation and summarizing of the
results of the election of the President of the Republic are beyond the scope of
jurisdiction of the Constitutional Court. The Constitutional Court considers,
that the opportunities given by the law regarding the solution of disputes con-
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The Court, however, did find discrepancies between the num-
ber of actual and registered voters, between invalidated ballots
and duplicative names on main and supplemental voter lists.110
The Court recommended that changes be made in the Electoral
Laws and noted the CEC and REC's failure to effectively organize
the election results.111 Nonetheless, the Court dismissed the ap-
peal regarding the invalidation of the CEC decision and the presi-
dential election. 112 Pursuant to the provisions in the Constitution,
the Court's decision is final, not subject to reconsideration, and
self-executing from the moment of its publication.113 Conse-
quently, the Court's decision validated the 1996 Presidential elec-
tion. This decision was criticized both in Armenia and by other
governments.
V. RECOMMENDATIONS IN ELECTION LAW
A. U.S. State Department Recommendations
The U.S. State Department stated that "the Court's handling
of the case did not dispel doubts about the credibility of the official
election results. ' 114 Further it noted that international observers
reported that serious breaches of the election law and numerous
irregularities concerned the overall integrity of the electoral proc-
ess.115 To avoid such detrimental consequences, the State De-
partment urged the Armenian Government to implement interna-
tional experts' recommendations to address the flaws and rebuild
nected with the preparation, implementation and summarizing of the elections
had not been sufficiently used by the candidates for the President of the Repub-
lic and their proxies.
Id
Further, the Court found that the documents offered by the Plaintiffs could not
serve as evidence as they represented mere impressions, suppositions and unverified ru-
mors. The Court organized a special investigation of all documents from 162 electoral
precincts and found only a discrepancy of 3 to 5 votes between the final protocols. The
documentation, serving as the basis for voting, was observed in 41 precincts. Partial in-
consistencies were found in the data of only 9 precincts. No numerical distortion had
taken place in the CEC regarding the presidential election results. The REC's data had
been summarized correctly.
110. See Presidential Report, supra note 25, at 20.
111. See id
112. See Country Report, supra note 75, at 8.
113. See Presidential Report, supra note 25, at 20.
114. Country Report, supra note 75, at 8.
115. See Presidential Report, supra note 25, at 16.
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public confidence in the electoral process.116
B. Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights
Recommendations
On September 24, 1996, the OSCE Office for Democratic In-
stitutions and Human Rights (ODIHR) released its Final Report
of the Armenian Presidential Election, and cited several recom-
mendations for future Armenian elections. 117 The recommenda-
tions addressed such issues as the authorization of persons in
polling stations, the alleviation of pressures placed on military
members to vote for a particular candidate and called for a revi-
sion of election law.118 The OSCE specifically evaluated the elec-
tion law relating to "vote count, verification and aggregation of the
results."119 The Report questioned the partisan nature of electoral
commissions and addressed the breakdown in the counting proc-
ess.12 0 It suggested standardized training for the members of the
CEC, and the creation of remedial regulations and responsibilities
within the CEC.121 Furthermore, the Report called for "formal
written agreements" in applying for campaign television airtime,
more accurate voting lists and military voter lists, and a "consistent
criteria" for invalidating ballots.122 To secure the implantation of
electoral reforms, the Report emphasizes that "those authorities
who do not administer the law correctly should be sanctioned.' 1 23
The ODIHR issued a final report on January 23, 1997, con-
cluding that Electoral Code changes needed to be made124 and fo-
cused on the need for addressing candidate withdrawal, ballot and
protocol processing, and publishing complete election results
within a reasonable time period after election day. 125
In accordance with the suggestions of the OSCE, Armenia
began the process of reform of the electoral code and process.
116. See Country Report, supra note 75, at 8.
117. See id.
118. See id.
119. OSCE FINAL REPORT, supra note 83.
120. See id.
121. See id.
122. See id
123. Id.
124. See Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights, Mission on Implemen-
tation of Recommendations in Final Report on Presidential Election in Armenia, ORG.
SEC. COOP. EUR., Jan. 23, 1997, at 3.
125. See id.
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Both the Standing Committee of the National Assembly on State
and Legal Issues and members of the opposition in the Assembly
submitted comprehensive drafts to address the concerns and ir-
regularities noted in the previous elections. However, in February
1998, before the Assembly was able to act on the proposals, Presi-
dent Levon Ter Petrossian, weakened by allegations and suspi-
cions that the 1996 election victory was achieved through fraud,
resigned. 126 Although his resignation was prompted primarily by
disputes over foreign policy, his questionable role in the contested
election eroded his authority and credibility.
As provided by the Constitution, elections took place on
March 18, 1998, within forty days of the resignation. Twelve can-
didates stood for election, including acting President Robert Ko-
charian. 127 Once again, foreign observers led by the OSCE and
Council of Europe monitored the election and once again found
the results less than satisfactory. 128 Serious irregularities were re-
corded in 15% of the 800 polling stations including "problems with
the voting process, voting by the military, the use of state re-
sources, the presence of police and other unauthorized personnel
at polling stations, media bias, and campaign violence. ' 129 Over-
all, the election was characterized as "deeply flawed" by the
OSCE.
Five candidates for the presidency issued a statement declar-
ing "that the extraordinary elections for the post of president of
the republic of Armenia, regardless of the results cannot be con-
sidered free and fair."' 130 Because none of the candidates received
a majority of the votes, a second round of elections involving the
two candidates who received the highest vote was scheduled for
March 30, 1998.131 Although the elections of March 16, 1998 and
126. APS Diplomat Redrawing the Isimac Map Arab Press, APSRIM, March 1, 1993,
available in 1993 WL 2498733.
127. Five Candidates Say Poll Not Free and Fair, BBC Broadcast, Mar. 9, 1998, avail-
able in LEXIS, World Library, BBCSWB File (listing the candidates and their respective
parties).
128. OSCE Observers Condemn Election Irregularities, BBC Broadcast, Mar. 20,
1998, available in LEXIS, World Library, BBCSWB File (quoting a OSCE statement:
"The electoral reforms put off because of these elections must continue.").
129. David Stern, CIS: OSCE Slams "Deeply Flawed" Armenia Poll, Mar. 9, 1998,
AAP Newsfeed, AAP Info. Services Pty. Ltd., at 1.
130. Five Candidates Say Poll Not Free and Fair, BBC Broadcast, Mar. 9, 1998, avail-
able in LEXIS, World Library, BBCSWB File.
131. See Stern, supra note 129, at 1; see also Kocharyan Wins Round of Armenia Vote
by 8 Percent, DEUTSCHE PRESSE AGENTUR, Mar. 19, 1998 (the "runoff" was "necessary
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March 30, 1998 did not meet the OSCE standards, they "showed
improvement in some respects over the 1996 election. ' 132 The
OSCE, however, recommended a "thorough, impartial and vigor-
ous investigation" of any irregularities and made further recom-
mendations to the Armenian election law."' 133
VI. CONCLUSION
Clearly the leadership in Armenia, which has espoused demo-
cratic values, must act now and continue the task of democratiza-
tion. A reform of the electoral code is critical to this process but is
only the first step. As with many laws, it is the implementation of
the law that might prove to be the most difficult task.
The conduct of an open and transparent election process in
accordance with established legislation is fundamental to a demo-
cratic society. Not only is the right of political participation linked
to the electoral process, but free and fair elections "presupposes
adherence to other basic human rights such as the right to freedom
of expression, movement, peaceful assembly and association. ' 134
Indeed, it has been stated, "Elections are a celebration of funda-
mental human rights. ' 135 While free and fair elections are a vi-
brant measure of democracy, transfer of power through the elec-
toral process is particularly important in emerging democracies. It
is only when all parties accept and abide by electoral results
achieved through free and fair elections that it can be concluded
that democratic principles have become entrenched.
because none of the twelve candidates received more than fifty percent of the ballots
cast); Armenia's PM, Former Leader Enter Presidential Runoff, THE XINHAU GENERAL
OVERSEAS NEWS SERVICE, Mar. 19, 1998; Tigar Liloyan, Kocharian Stand Chances to
Emerge Armenian President, ITAR-TASS NEWS AGENCY, Mar. 19, 1998.
132. REPUBLIC OF ARMENIA PRESIDENTIAL ELECTION MARCH 16 AND MARCH 30,
1998, FINAL REPORT (Office of Democratic Institutions and Human Rights, 1998).
133. Id.
134. ELECTION HANDBOOK, supra note 18, at 1.
135. See id.
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